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On March 29, 1976, Paraguayan police abducted seventeen-
year-old Joelito Filartiga from his parents' home just outside Asun-
cion. He died sometime later that day from a combination of beat-
ings and electrical shocks and burns. Joelito's offense was being the
son of Dr. Joel Filartiga, a physician who was himself tortured and
imprisoned three times for his open opposition to President Alfredo
Stroessner.
Since the Nuremburg trials and the attendant worldwide reac-
tion to Nazi attrocities, the world has taken an increasing interest in
preventing government torture. Whenever legal fictions such as na-
tional borders and other sovereignty concepts have acted as barriers
to torture prevention, the world has responded, slowly and incre-
mentally, with new legal fictions to overcome those barriers. A re-
cent case in a United States federal court, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,1
is a significant new increment toward the prevention of torture and
more generally the international protection of human rights. Filar-
tiga holds that torture, long prohibited by virtually all nations' laws
and several international conventions and declarations, is now pro-
hibited by customary international law. The case further provides for
jurisdiction in a disinterested forum for individual torture claims.
Along with Filartiga's promise are many problematic issues: the
jurisdictional theory,' the validity of international torture norms,3
* Member of the Oklahoma and Texas Bars. B.A. 1973, Oklahoma State University;
J.D. 1978, University of Tulsa; LL.M. 1983, Columbia. As a Columbia graduate law student
from 1981-83 the author observed the latter part of the Filartiga case and exchanged research
notes with plaintiffs' attorneys. The author is now practicing with North Central Texas Legal
Services and teaching conflict of laws at Southern Methodist University.
1. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2. See generally Rusk, A Comment on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, II GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 311 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Rusk); D'Zurilla, Individual Responsibility for
Torture Under International Law, 56 TUL. L. REV. 186 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
D'Zurrilla]; Comment, Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations: Interpreting the Alien
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choice of law, 4 and the real value of such lawsuits.5 Threaded among
these problems is a more fundamental question pertaining to the na-
ture of this action-what kind of lawsuit is Filartiga? It is a claim
under customary international law brought in a United States fed-
eral court. The claim is based on events which occurred in Paraguay
for the death of a Paraguayan at the hands of a Paraguayan official.
Because of these unusual elements, the Filartiga action has been
called many things: an international action, an action under federal
common law, a transitory tort, a dedoublement fonctionnel action,
an instance of universal jurisdiction, and an example of protective
jurisdiction.6
Filartiga cannot be all of these things. Some are mutually ex-
clusive. Others are potential complements, such as the international
action and federal common law, or the transitory tort and universal
jurisdiction. Although these labels address different aspects of the
Filartiga action,7 they are all interrelated. Each has legal implica-
tions for Filartiga's jurisdiction, choice of law,8 or both. It is there-
fore necessary to characterize-or define'-the Filartiga action.
Defining Filartiga is more than an academic exercise for an al-
ready concluded case-there is a practical purpose. Filartiga-type
claims are likely to recur in the future because of the following
circumstances:
(1) Filartiga involves an act of torture by a mid-to-high-ranking
Tort Statute, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 413 (1981); Note, 28 U.S.C. 1350." A Legal Remedy
for Torture in Paraguay? 69 GEo. L.J. 833 (1981); 49 U. CINN. L. REV. 880 (1980). See also
infra note 20.
3. See supra note 2.
4. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
5. Questions on Filartiga's value to the human rights movement follow two major
themes: skepticism that such lawsuits have any positive impact because the remedies arguably
cannot be enforced (these comments tend to be conversational and not the product of scholarly
work), and that Filartiga-type litigation will produce more bad than good vis-a-vis foreign
policy. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Robb, J., concurring).
6. These terms are defined and analyzed infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 147-48.
8. For example, transitory tort refers to the situs of the occurrence and has implica-
tions for jurisdiction and choice of law. Universal jurisdiction refers to international law's ju-
risdictional grant to states for certain offenses, providing personal jurisdiction but having no
implications for choice of law.
Throughout the analysis of Filartiga, various jurisdictional and choice of law implications
which arise from certain characterizations or definitions will be noted. These jurisdictional and
choice of law comments, however, are merely cursory and are based solely on an examination
of Filartiga and the legal theory of a right to sue. A proper choice of law analysis should also
consider various interests of the international system, the United States forum, the situs of the
delict, and the parties involved.
9. "Define" as used here means to "characterize" as that term is used in conflict of
laws. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
CONFLICT RESTATEMENT]. Although "characterize" is the term of art, the word "define" will
be used because most of this Article is devoted to defining labels being applied to Filartiga,
and because "define" is more cognizable to those readers not well versed in a conflict of laws
analysis.
DEFINING Filartiga
foreign government official-the Inspector General of Police in
Paraguay. While government torture in the United States is
most commonly committed by low-ranking police officers, the
perpetrator of torture incidents in many foreign countries is
likely to be a mid-to-high-ranking official. Examples include
Nazi torturers and more recently, Argentine military leaders.
(These two examples are for illustration-the reader can no
doubt think of others.) Involvement of important government of-
ficials in torture seems particularly likely where political sup-
pression is the goal. This is because suppression of political op-
ponents and dissidents does not originate with low-ranking police
officers.
(2) Many mid-to-high-ranking government officials who commit
torture are well paid (even where graft is not involved), and
many travel internationally, though not necessarily to the
United States. While travelling on government matters they
may be immune from Filartiga-type jurisdiction. But when
travelling privately they may be subject to service of process,
especially if their presence in the forum is more than
momentary.
It may be possible to extend Filartiga-type jurisdiction to other
cases, such as claims against governments. Regardless of whether Fi-
lartiga-type claims could be successfully brought against a govern-
ment, however, they are likely to recur in the case of a foreign gov-
ernment official who is in the United States on nondiplomatic status.
That official would be subject to jurisdiction for torture claims in the
Second Circuit, and eventually in other federal circuits.
Thus, Filartiga is the paradigm for studying private torture
claims against foreign officials in the United States. As the para-
digm, the Filartiga action must be succinctly defined. This will assist
inquiries into its judicial jurisdiction and choice of law, and it will
make Filartiga-type cases more understandable and therefore more
acceptable to critics. This discussion is limited to the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a foreign official for a private torture claim
brought in the United States. Although this analysis is focused nar-
rowly on Filartiga, it is designed to enhance understanding of future
torture claims as well.
B. Definitions
Filartiga I10 refers to the Second Circuit's jurisdictional opin-
ion. Filartiga I1P refers to the district court's damages opinion. Ref-
erences simply to Filartiga will designate the lawsuit in general, or a
10. Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. Filartiga !!, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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specific portion such as the district court's initial dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction.
"United States" is used instead of "America." "United States
courts" refers to all courts in the United States, both federal and
state. Specific references to federal courts will be identified as such.
"State" means "a territorial unit with a distinct general body of
law."" 2 Thus, New York, Paraguay, and the United States are all
states. Synonyms are nation and nation-state, but they will generally
be avoided in favor of "state."
"International law" means public international law, or "the law
of nations," that is, the law regulating relations between states, or
regulating the singular conduct of states in particular areas such as
human rights."3 International law in this Article does not include pri-
vate international law, the latter being synonymous with conflicts of
law. 4
"Civil" means non-criminal, as in civil remedies or civil actions
in the English common-law sense. When references are made to the
legal system known as the civil law system, specific states such as
France or Germany will be mentioned, or there will be additional
clarifying language.
"Lex delicti" means the law of the state in which the wrong
occurred. "Lex fori" means the law of the forum state. "Torture" is
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
12. CONFLICT RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 3 and comments following. The new Ten-
tative Draft of the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW defines "state" as
"an entity which has a defined territory and permanent population, under control of a govern-
ment, and which engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such
entities." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 210 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1981). See also Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S.
No. 881 [hereinafter cited as 1933 Convention]. Only the CONFLICT RESTATEMENT defines
"state" so as to include each component of a federal-state system; e.g., Texas is a "state"
under the CONFLICT RESTATEMENT definition, but not under the international law definition as
stated in the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW and the 1933 Conven-
tion, supra.
The international law definition is arguably more appropriate to this discussion. Any in-
ternational torture claim would be based either on international law per se, or the law of one
or more national systems, and not on the law of a federal component (e.g., New York) that
lacks the capacity to engage in foreign relations. But because choice of law analyses customa-
rily define "state" legal systems as including New York and Texas, the CONFLICT RESTATE-
MENT analysis will comply.
13. " 'International law,' as used in this Restatement, deals with the conduct of states
and of international organizations, and with their relations with persons, whether natural or
juridical." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 101 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1980).
One casebook defines international law as "the body of 'rules which are considered legally
binding by states with each other;' or 'the principles which are in force between all indepen-
dent nations.'" L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL 'LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS LVII (1980) [hereinafter cited as HENKIN, P. S. & S.].
14. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 101 comment c
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980). See also Stevenson, The Relationship of Private International Law
to Public International Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 561-64 (1952).
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DEFINING Filartiga
mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a
public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
his or a third person information or confession, punishing him
for an act he has committed or is suspected of having commit-
ted, or intimidating him or other persons. 5
II. Filartiga and the Private Enforcement of Torture Claims
A. Human Rights Background
The years following the Second World War have seen an ever
increasing demand for internationally standardized human rights.
This demand has resulted in promulgation of international conven-
tions underscoring particular rights,1 6 as well as such general ac-
knowledgement as the United Nations Charter's guarantee of "basic
human rights and fundamental freedoms.1 7 While the popular man-
date for international human rights is clear, the implementation of
these rights is less certain.
One of the major roadblocks to implementation is the absence
of a true international judicial structure."8 Commentators have urged
that various state court systems be used for international human
rights claims when it is possible to obtain personal jurisdiction.' 9 In
15. Declarations on the Protection of All Persons From Being Subjected to Torture,
G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975).
16. Most notable of the human rights declarations is the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GOAR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). For a more com-
plete listing and discussion, see BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (I.
Brownlie 2d ed. 1981); THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER (W. Laquer & B. Rubin ed. 1979).
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. Additionally, the Charter's preamble states, "We
the peoples of the United Nations determined ...to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women
and of nations large and small ... ." Id. at preamble.
18. The International Court of Justice at the Hague has jurisdiction to decide disputes
between nations, based generally on the ad hoc consent of the disputing nations. Nations have,
however, submitted to compulsory jurisdiction by treaty. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 716-28 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BROWNLIE]. The
United Nations has established various administrative procedures for investigating alleged
human rights violations. See Cassese, Two United Nations Procedures for the Implementation
of Human Rights-The Role that Lawyers Can Play Therein, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE, (J. Tuttle rev. ed. 1978); Van Boven, Human Rights Fora at the
United Nations, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE, (J. Tuttle rev. ed.
1978) (there are also regional human rights tribunals such as the European Court of Human
Rights). See BROWNLIE, supra, at 574-76.
None of these courts or commissions has compulsory jurisdiction over individual human
rights claims in the manner of domestic courts, although the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Human Rights is close to that of domestic courts. See L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL,
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1104-08 (1973) (noting that only Malta,
Turkey, and Cyprus are holdouts in accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the European
Court). Other than the European Court, it is unlikely that any international or regional court
will have such jurisdiction over nations in the near future.
19. See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER (1964) [hereinafter cited as FALK]. See also Address by Lillich, The Enforcement of
International Human Rights Norms in Domestic Courts, American Bar Association National
Institute on International Human Rights Law and Practice, in Washington, D.C. (April 26,
1978) [hereinafter cited as Lillichi, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
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the United States, however, courts have hesitated or refused to rec-
ognize international human rights as actionable law. 0 Unsuccessful
attempts to litigate international human rights claims in United
States courts have prompted comments such as the one made by
Professor Richard Lillich in a. 1978 speech to the American Bar
Association:
Although the Sei Fujii case, now over a quarter of a cen-
tury old, held that the human rights provisions of the United
Nations Charter were not self-executing in that they 'do not
purport to impose legal obligations on the individual member
PRACTICE (J. Tuttle rev. ed. 1978); Sohn, Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations, 11
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307 (1981).
20. In the United States, for example, federal courts have generally refused to accept
the various international declarations and covenants on human rights as enforceable law. Cases
not sustaining jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) (Filartiga's
jurisdictional base), include Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa.
1963) (holding that negligence is not a violation of international law); accord Damaskionos v.
Societa Navigacion Interamericana S.A., Panama, 255 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (unsafe
working condictions, unseaworthiness of vessel not violations of the law of nations); Abiodun v.
Martin Oil Service, 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973) (breach of obligation to train plaintiffs as
executives not a violation of international law); Khedival Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l
Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960) (§ 1350 did not grant jurisdiction to enjoin picketing by
United States seamen since international law recognized no universal right to unimpeded ac-
cess to harbors); Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (confiscation of property on
racial grounds and subsequent repudiation of settlement was not a violation of international
law); I1T v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (cause of action for fraud, conversion,
and corporate waste disallowed because the Bible's Eighth Commandment "thou shalt not
steal" is not a part of international law). In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp.
542 (D.D.C. 1981), jurisdiction was denied on multiple grounds, principally for failure to al-
lege facts connecting defendants to the offense. The district court took the opportunity to issue
strong dicta against Filartiga.
The Tel-Oren dismissal was recently affirmed. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). However, each of the three circuit judges offered a separate opin-
ion, with Judge Edwards strongly supporting the notion of § 1350 torture litigation, but voting
for dismissal of the Tel-Oren complaint for failing to allege facts sufficient for jurisdiction.
Judge Bork concurred in the dismissal, but on the ground that no private right of action exists
for violations of international human rights law. Judge Robb also concurred in the dismissal,
but believed the entire area of international human rights law is non-justiciable in United
States courts for political reasons. Jurisdiction was also denied in Sanchez v. Reagan, 568 F.
Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), an action seeking to vindicate international human rights for people
allegedly injured by the actions of United States officials and their agents in Nicaragua. In
Jafari v. Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. I1. 1982), the court denied jurisdiction in a claim for
expropriated property in Iran, deeming that international law did not prohibit a state's expro-
priation of its own nationals' property. Jurisdiction in Akbar v. New York Magazine Co., 490
F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1980), was denied because plaintiffs' libel claim did not fall under any
international norm of United States treaty, as required by the Alien Tort Statute.
Cases sustaining jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute include Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.
Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (restitution of wartime neutral's cargo which was on board
Spanish ship seized as war prize); Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D.
Md. 1961) (child custody award upheld because defendant's falsification of the child's passport
in child snatching attempt violated international law); Siderman v. Argentina, No. 82-1772
(C.D. Cal.) (Sept. 28, 1984).
But see Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissenger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975) (seizure of children
in Vietnam and subsequent transportation to United States was "apparently a tort under inter-
national law . . .", but the case was inadequately briefed and possibly lacked an indispensable
party). See Blum and Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 55
nn.8-10 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Blum and Steinhardt].
DEFINING Filartiga
nations or to create rights in private persons,' numerous at-
tempts have been made over the years to invoke that Charter,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other interna-
tional legal instruments in domestic court cases ...
While generally unsuccessful, these imaginative efforts,
unique in the annals of United States legal history, someday
may bear fruit if domestic courts can be convinced to rethink
their traditional attitudes and adopt a more enlightened ap-
proach toward international human rights claims."
Proponents of Lillich's view argue for enforcement of human
rights norms in United States courts under two theories. First, they
argue that international law is part of United States federal common
law. Therefore, a United States forum could fairly adjudicate both
law and fact despite the tribunal's distance from the alleged offense
and its unfamiliarity with the alien culture.2 Second, and more
broadly, some human rights advocates argue that United States fed-
eral courts and the higher courts of other nations compose the judi-
cial branch of an international legal order and have a duty to imple-
ment international human rights law regardless of its status as part
of their domestic law. 23 This latter theory is commonly called the
dedoublement fonctionnel concept, credited to the German scholar
Georges Scelle1 4 Both of these arguments have generally failed in
the United States, at least until 1979.
Shortly after Lillich's speech, however, Dolly Filartiga filed an
action in federal court for her brother's alleged torture death at the
hands of another Paraguayan who was then living in Brooklyn. The
Second Circuit's recognition that her claim under international law
was litigable in the United States signaled a notable exception to
prior United States practice. It may, in fact, mark the "rethink(ing)
of traditional attitudes and adopt(ing) of a more enlightened ap-
proach toward international human rights claims" that Professor Lil-
lich called for.
Although Filartiga was only recently decided on the merits (af-
ter its 1980 remand), it has already generated numerous law review
articles,2" news accounts, 6 and is discussed in the recently published
third tentative draft of the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Rela-
21. Lillich, supra note 19.
22. See generally supra note 19.
23. See FALK, supra note 19.
24. See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
25. See Claude, The Case of Joelito Filartiga and the Clinic of Hope, 5 HuM. RTS. Q.
275 (1983) (best factual account of Filartiga).
26. See N.Y. Times, Jul. 1, 1980, at B3, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Times]; Nat'l
L.J., Oct. 13, 1980, at 1, col. 4. See also Kaufman, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, (Magazine), at
44-52 (article on Filartiga's jurisdiction by author of appellate opinion).
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tions.27 Although much of the legal commentary has focused on the
jurisdictional analysis, many comment-worthy issues arose after the
jurisdictional decision. Most notable is the choice of law question:
what law should a domestic court apply to the merits of a torture
claim invoked under international law? The following brief account
of Filartiga's jurisdictional litigation (Filartiga I) depicts this choice
of law problem, both as it was resolved in Filartiga and as it will be
faced in future litigation.
B. The Filartiga Case
1. The Facts.-Dr. Joel Filartiga is a physician who runs a
medical clinic in a rural area near Asuncion, Paraguay. He is also a
long-time political dissident who opposes Paraguay's President, Gen-
eral Alfredo Stroessner 38 Because of his political activity, Dr. Filar-
tiga and his family have been harrassed for years. Dr. Filartiga him-
self was tortured and imprisoned three times in the 1960's.29 The
repression was stepped up in March, 1976, when Paraguayan police
took Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year-old son, Joelito, from the Filar-
tiga home and tortured him until he died.
Amerigo Norberto Pena-Irala was Inspector General of Police
in Asuncion at the time of Joelito's death, and, according to the Fi-
lartigas, is the man who killed him. The Filartigas contend that
Pena's guilt and his bold abuse of authority are shown by the way in
which he had the Filartiga's then-teenage daughter, Dolly, brought
to his home on the same day her brother disappeared. Pena showed
her Joelito's mutilated body and shouted after her as she ran in hor-
ror, "Here you have what you have been looking for for so long and
what you deserve. Now shut up."3 According to investigators from
the Organization of American States and Amnesty International,
Pena is notorious for his acts of torture and murder on behalf of
General Stroessner's government.3 '
On the basis of Dolly Filartiga's observation of Joelito's body in
27. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 reporters' note 5; id.
§ 703 reporters' note 7 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982); id. § 428 reporters' note 4 (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1983).
28. General Stroessner has been President of Paraguay since 1954, and has continued
the practice of repeatedly suspending the national constitution under the cloak of a continuing
state of emergency. The Organization of American States (O.A.S.) and Amnesty International
report that Stroessner's regime is one of the worst in Latin America for human rights viola-
tions. See, e.g., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PARAGUAY, ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES (1978).
29. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
30. Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d at 878. Reports from Amnesty International and O.A.S. state
that "Pena and three other policemen beat, whipped, and administered high voltage electric
shocks that killed [Joelito]." N.Y. Times, supra note 26.




Pena's home (the apparent site of the torture), and additional evi-
dence, the Filartigas filed a criminal complaint against Pena and the
police for Joelito's death. During the ensuing investigation, one Hugo
Duarte asserted that he had killed Joelito after catching him in
flagrante delicto with Duarte's wife. The Filartigas argue that Du-
arte's confession is a ruse conceived by Pena to cover his own guilt;3"
Duarte's mother is Pena's live-in mistress, and autopsy reports show
that Joelito died of torture-induced injuries inconsistent with Du-
arte's version of the killing. 3 According to the Filartigas, their pur-
suit of a local remedy was further hampered when their attorney was
arrested, shackled, threatened with death, and disbarred without
cause for his connection with the Filartigas34 After losing their at-
torney, the Filartigas continued to pursue the complaint pro se by
challenging the Duarte confession and other findings concerning Joe-
lito's death. The local remedies proved to be hopeless. Paraguay has
since dropped the criminal investigation and dismissed the
complaint.3 5
Two years after Joelito's death, Pena sold his home in Paraguay
and came to the United States on a visitor's visa-a move that the
Filartigas contend was caused by the growing Paraguayan public
outcry over Joelito's death and other attrocities allegedly committed
by Pena. Seeking to vindicate her brother's death, Dolly Filartiga
followed Pena to the United States. Upon learning that Pena was
living in Brooklyn on an expired visa, she reported him to the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service. Pena was arrested, and on April
5, 1979, ordered deported.3
Before Pena could be deported, Dolly Filartiga filed a civil com-
plaint against him in the United States District Court in Brooklyn.
She sought damages and other relief for her brother's death as well
as an injunction preventing Pena's deportation during the litigation.
The theory of her action was that Pena had violated international
human rights law by torturing and killing Joelito. She argued that
the court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Stat-
ute which provides jurisdiction for "any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
32. The Second Circuit Filarliga opinion reported that Duarte "has never been con-
victed or sentenced in connection with the crime." Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d at 878. But further
testimony by Dr. Filartiga at the damages hearing on February 12, 1982, indicated that Dr.
Filartiga believed that Duarte would not have been charged in any event, partly because
Paraguayan law allows a husband to kill his wife, her lover, or both after catching them in an
act of adultery. Paraguayan law does not allow the same defense for a wife.
33. Testimony of Dr. Filartiga and Dolly Filartiga, Filartiga Damages Hearing
(E.D.N.Y.) (Feb. 12, 1982).
34. Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d at 878.
35. Interview with plaintiffs' attorney, Rhonda Copelon, in New York City (June 5,
1983).
36. Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d at 879. See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1979, at B4, col. 2.
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States."3 7
Pena moved to dismiss, asserting a lack of subject matter juris-
diction and forum non conveniens. He prevailed on the jurisdictional
challenge. The district court found that Pena's alleged acts did not
amount to a violation of international law-a finding based solely on
prior unsuccessful human rights cases,3" and not on a de novo exami-
nation of international law. Pending their appeal of the jurisdiction
questions, the Filartigas tried to have Pena's deportation further en-
joined. Their attempts failed and Pena, to his relief, was allowed to
leave the United States. 9
2. The Second Circuit's Jurisdictional Ruling-Filartiga
I.-Although it had denied the Filartigas' motion to stay Pena's de-
portation, the Second Circuit put life back into the lawsuit after con-
sidering the merits of subject matter jurisdiction. The court based its
finding of jurisdiction on a framework of international law and fed-
eral common law embraced in the Alien Tort Statute (section 1350),
a United States jurisdictional statute passed by the First Congress
and rarely used since.
The court began its analysis under section 1350 by noting that
the Filartigas were not invoking rights under a United States treaty.
Accordingly, the primary question was whether international law it-
self prohibits torture. Succeeding questions necessary for the Filarti-
gas' allegations to fall within section 1350 were: (1) whether the fact
that the victim and the defendant were both Paraguayan defeated
the international status of the offense; and (2) whether under the
Constitution an international law claim may be litigated in a United
States court.
After finding that international law did prohibit torture by gov-
ernments and their agents,40 that the shared nationality of victim
and torturer did not reduce the offense to a local one,41 and that
section 1350's authorization to apply international law in United
States federal courts was constitutional,"' the court concluded that
plaintiffs had stated a claim litigable in a United States federal
court. The case was remanded for trial.
37. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(h), I Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1982)).
38. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
39. Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d at 880. Pena's relief upon leaving is shown by his comment to
the New York Times: "All we want is to be sent back to our country as quickly as possible."
N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1979 at B4, col 2. It is further shown by Pena's legal opposition to further
stay of his deportation. See Filartiga, No. 79-917 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 1979) (requesting expe-
diting of deportation) (letter from Murray D. Broehin, defendant's attorney, May 18, 1979)
(filed with the court).
40. Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d at 884.
41. Id. at 884-85.
42, Id. at 885-89.
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3. The Damages Award-Filartiga H.-Upon remand, the
now-absent Pena and his attorneys from both Paraguay and the
United States decided not to pursue his defense. They failed to file
an answer to the now-viable complaint and a default judgment re-
sulted.43 The judgment was limited, however, to a finding that Pena
was civilly liable for Joelito's death. No damages were awarded and
no remedies applied because the district court had no factual evi-
dence as to plaintiffs' injuries, and it was in doubt as to which law
governed.4' The district court referred these questions to a
magistrate.
On February 12, 1982, the magistrate heard testimony as to the
manner of Joelito's death and the resulting harm to his family. After
receiving evidence, the magistrate asked plaintiffs' attorneys to sub-
mit arguments as to what law should govern damages and what
types of damages would be recoverable under that law. Plaintiffs'
attorneys submitted arguments for recovery under both international
and Paraguayan law.' 5 On May 13, 1983, the magistrate issued his
recommendation to award $375,000 in damages under Paraguayan
law.'
Now that the magistrate's recommendation was before the dis-
trict court the parties had an opportunity to object. Plaintiffs did
object, but only to the magistrate's denial of court costs and punitive
damages; both denials were based on the unavailability of those
damages under Paraguayan law.' Plaintiffs urged that the appropri-
ate remedy to be fashioned for this seminal case was under lex
delicti (Paraguayan law) to the extent that it adequately reflected
international policy against torture, and that where lex delicti fell
short of the international standard, a supplemental measure of dam-
ages should be provided.' 8 The district court adopted plaintiffs' argu-
43. Filartiga, No. 79-917 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 1981) (order of default judgment).
44. The Second Circuit also expressed doubt as to the applicable law in Filartiga. See
Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d at 889 n.25 and accompanying text.
45. Filartiga, No. 79-917 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1982), (plaintiffs' memorandum on dam-
ages) (The Filartigas claimed $202,979.00 in present pecuniary losses; $236,760.00 in future
losses).
46. Filartiga, No. 79-917 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 1983; addendum May 20, 1983) (magis-
trate's report and recommendation). The Magistrate recommended a total award to the Filar-
tigas of $375,000.00 under Paraguayan law, which the Magistrate applied pursuant to the
Second Circuit's dicta that Paraguayan law might be appropriate. Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d at 889
n.25 and accompanying text.
47. The Filartiga district court ascertained Paraguayan law from the affidavits of two
experts, Jose Emilio Gorostiaga for the defendant, and later at the damages phase on remand,
Alejandro M. Garro for the plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs sought a copy of the Paraguayan
Civil Code via inquiries to the Paraguayan consulate, the Library of Congress, and several law
schools, no copies were located.
48. Plaintiffs' argument that Paraguayan law ought to be applied initially, and supple-
mented to the extent that it fell short of the spirit and intent of the international torture
proscription, was patterned after article 50 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 50, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S.
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ment in its opinion issued early in 1984."9 The opinion approved the
magistrate's recommendation of $375,000 in actual damages to the
two plaintiffs, and added $10,364 in court costs and $5,000,000 in
punitive damages for each plaintiff, for a total of $10,385,364.
Because there was a default judgment as to Pena's liability, Fi-
lartiga's choice of law dealt only with damages. Even when limited
to damages, however, choice of law is crucial. The question is which
damages should be allowed in torture cases: loss of income, medical
and burial expenses, pain and suffering, survivor's grief, or punitive
damages. Strictly within the context of United States law, these
items of recovery can vary widely from state to state. When this
context is expanded to include common law, civil law, and other le-
gal systems, the variance is even greater. This variance between legal
systems will be amplified when Filartiga's progeny are litigated fully
on the merits. Issues concerning the definition of torture and permis-
sible defenses will depend on the law that is selected. The first step
in choosing substantive law is to determine the nature of the claim.
III. The Background for Defining Filartiga
A. Filartiga's Labels
Commentators have used a variety of descriptive labels in refer-
ring to the Filartiga cause of action. Some labels have been casually
or mistakenly applied, while others may or may not be correct de-
pending on one's view of the case. Most have been applied in a con-
clusory manner without the analysis needed to verify their accuracy.
One author who worked on the plaintiffs' jurisdictional brief for
Filartiga describes the action as a transitory tort concurrent with an
international action under United States law, and alternatively as a
transitory international action.50 Professor Louis Sohn calls Filartiga
an action for a universal delict. 51 Professor Rusk terms Filartiga an
action under United States jurisdiction for a violation of interna-
tional law. He analogizes the Filartiga court to an old common-law
court whose judge knew a wrong when he saw it and did not worry
about the stricter limits of positive law.5 2 Rusk's description of the
Filartiga action as a hybrid of international law and United States
jurisdiction is the most popular among Filartiga commentaries. This
description has been phrased a number of different ways: (1) a
nonfederal cause of action under international law with jurisdiction
5.
49. Filartiga 11, 577 F. Supp. at 864-65.
50. Blum and Steinhardt, supra note 20, at 97-103.
51. Sohn, Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations, II GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
307 (1981).
52. Rusk, supra note 2, at 311-12.
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in a United States court;5" (2) an action under federal jurisdiction
involving international law;54 (3) federal jurisdiction for a violation
of the law of nations;55 and (4) international law as creating a fed-
eral cause of action. 56 The article providing this last description also
suggested that Filartiga might be an instance of protective jurisdic-
tion, or alternatively a transitory action.57
To counter this popular description of Filartiga as a hybrid be-
tween international substantive law and United States jurisdiction,
Professor Wilner refers to Filartiga as an instance in which a na-
tional court applied international law. In so doing, the national court
was acting as an international forum.58 This may appear to be a va-
riation on the hybrid theme, but it is not. The various hybrid labels
draw on the notion that international law is part of the domestic law
of each state. Under this theory a state court applying international
law is simply applying an aspect of its own law. In contrast, Wilner's
theory flows from the dedoublement fonctionnel concept 59 that state
courts serve not only as courts in their respective territories, but col-
lectively as an international judiciary. Consequently, such courts
have authority to hear international claims such as Filartiga. One
distinctive result of the dedoublement fonctionnel concept is its im-
plicit requirement that all states provide a forum for international
human rights claims regardless of whether local law provides judicial
jurisdiction.
Finally it is necessary to consider the labels used by the Filar-
tiga courts. The Second Circuit referred to the claim principally as
an action for violation of "universally accepted norms of the interna-
tional law of human rights . ,,.o The court also noted the incor-
poration of international law into federal common law. In other parts
of its decision, however, the Second Circuit discussed Filartiga as a
transitory tort and a wrongful death action, and compared it to
piracy and slavery prosecutions under universal jurisdiction."1 The
53. Comment, The Loneliness of the Long Distance Statute: The Alien Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1263 (1980).
54. Comment, International Law and Human Rights-Alien Tort Claims Under 28
U.S.C. § 1350: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 66 MINN. L. REV. 357 (1982).
55. Comment, 28 U.S.C. 1350: A Legal Remedy for Torture in Paraguay? 69 GEO.
L.J. 833 (1981).
56. Comment, Torture as a Tort in Violation of International law: Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 33 STAN. L. REV. 353 (1981).
57. Id. at 360-63.
58. Wilner, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: Comments on Sources of Human Rights Law and
Means of Redress for Violations of Human Rights, II GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 317 (1981).
59. Id. at 322. See infra notes 172-78 for a brief explanation of dedoublement
fonctionnel.
60. Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d at 878, 880. See also id. at 884, 886 (absorption of the inter-
national tort into federal common law).
61. The court observed that transitory actions have always been litigable in the lower
state courts in the United States. Id. at 885. The court did not state that Filartiga is a transi-
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Second Circuit's multifaceted description was simplified upon re-
mand when the district court expressly addressed the question of
"Filartiga's nature," or characterization. Observing that Filartiga
could be deemed either a wrongful death action arising under
Paraguayan law or a claim based on international law, the court
chose the latter and concluded that international law must therefore
control the substantive issues.6 2 Although the district court's charac-
terization of Filartiga as an international tort under federal common
law appears to be correct, further consideration is necessary to deter-
mine the accuracy of other labels applied by the Second Circuit
(transitory and universal) and by other commentators (protective ju-
risdiction and dedoublement fonctionnel action). Simply because Fi-
lartiga may be defined as an international tort litigated under fed-
eral common law does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of
other characterizations.
B. Defining Filartiga Through Jurisdictional Rules
Jurisdiction has many meanings. The first step in pinpointing
Filartiga's jurisdictional base and cause of action is to narrow these
meanings. A generic definition for jurisdiction is "the authority to
affect legal interests."6 The authority referred to is usually state au-
thority because a state is the entity creating most legal interests.
State authority is divided into three categories representing a state's
three functions: (1) legislative jurisdiction, or a state's authority to
make rules; (2) executive jurisdiction, or a state's authority to en-
force rules; and (3) judicial jurisdiction, or a state's authority to sub-
ject persons and things to the process of its courts.6 4 This Article
focuses primarily on judicial jurisdiction, although much of the dis-
cussion will apply to legislative jurisdiction as well. Executive juris-
tory action. It may be inferred that the court did not deem Filartiga transitory because the
court distinguished between transitory actions litigable in state courts and international claims
litigable as federal common law only in federal courts. Nonetheless, many have read this dis-
cussion as calling Filartiga transitory. The Second Circuit also referred to Filartiga as a claim
for wrongful death, because the plaintiff pleaded an alternative wrongful death claim under
Paraguayan law. Id. at 878-79. Although the Second Circuit kept the distinction in mind
between a wrongful death action and a torture claim under international law, this reference to
wrongful death may lead to mischaracterizations. Equally confusing is the Second Circuit's
equating Filartiga with piracy and slavery prosecutions. Id. at 890. Those prosecutions are
traditionally subject to universal jurisdiction as delicts prohibited by the national law of most
nations. In these cases international law grants jurisdiction to try the defendant under forum
law. It is likely that the Second Circuit was making no more than a rhetorical allusion to
piracy and slavery prosecutions, but if the court meant literal comparisons, then it may be
confusing universal jurisdiction with § 1350 jurisdiction.
62. Filartiga 11, 577 F. Supp. at 862-63.
63. See HENKIN, P. S. & S., supra note 13, at 420.
64. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (Tent. Draft No.
3, 1982) (where jurisdiction terminology becomes "jurisdiction to prescribe" (legislative), "ju-
risdiction to enforce" (executive), and "jurisdiction to adjudicate" (judicial)). See also Mann,
The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, III HAGUE RECUEIL [19641].
[Vol. 3:1
DEFINING Filartiga
diction is not considered even though it is important to enforcement
of Filartiga-type judgments.
IV. United States Jurisdiction as Defining Filartiga
To define Filartiga through its judicial jurisdiction under
United States law, it is only necessary to examine subject matter
jurisdiction. The United States analysis is further limited to civil ju-
risdiction because Filartiga is only a civil action as far as United
States law is concerned.65 But the international torture norm invoked
in Filartiga is as much criminal as civil, and as the analysis shifts
from United States law to international law, criminal jurisdiction
will be considered with civil."
In examining Filartiga's subject matter jurisdiction under
United States law, the first step is to note that the action was
brought in a federal court, and therefore must be either a federal
question or a diversity of citizenship case. It clearly is not a diversity
case, although lawyers have mistakenly discussed it as such. Both
the Filartigas and Pena-Irala are Paraguayan. This fits into none of
the diversity categories. 7
Filartiga must, then, be a federal question case. But what sort
of federal question? Several types exist. In addition to general fed-
eral question cases, 8 there are actions against foreign states, admi-
ralty and maritime cases, appeals of certain administrative actions,
patent cases, tax cases, and other federal subject matter categories. 9
On one hand, Filartiga can be described as simply a general federal
question. It is based on international law, which is federal common
law under the Constitution and case precedent,70 and thus entitled to
federal court jurisdiction.7 But Filartiga's subject matter (as
65. Not only is Filartiga a civil action on its face (a private claim for damages), but it
must remain a civil action and no more to retain its jurisdiction under § 1350's limitation to
actions "for a tort only."
66. For reasons to consider Filartiga as a criminal action, see infra notes 95-107 and
accompanying text.
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). See also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1060-
62 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. There is no diversity category for
a lawsuit with all foreign parties; a United States citizen must be on one or both sides of the
dispute.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) provides as follows: "The district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."
69. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-64 (1982).
70. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 131-35 and com-
ments following (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980). As discussed in the RESTATEMENT, authority for
the status of international law in the law of the United States is founded in the constitution,
e.g., art. I1, section 2; statutes, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1350 (1982); and case law, e.g.,The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
71. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 131 comment e (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1980). Federal jurisdiction may be exclusive, i.e., lower state courts may be pre-
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pleaded in the complaint) is more specific than a general federal
question. It is a claim under section 1350, which provides for "origi-
nal jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."72
Section 1350 resembles other specific federal question statutes such
as section 1333 (admiralty), or section 1340 (federal tax) in so far as
these jurisdictional statutes create original jurisdiction in federal dis-
trict courts for cases arising under specific bodies of substantive law.
Some authorities-including the Second Circuit in Filartiga
P 3-have pointed out that section 1350 is nothing more than a juris-
dictional grant for Filartiga, and that section 1350 merely creates
jurisdiction without providing any substantive rights or remedies.
Their conclusion is that section 1350 leaves open the choice of law
question."' This conclusion misplaces the role of section 1350 as a
jurisdictional statute. True, it merely grants jurisdiction without
spelling out the substantive rights and remedies, but the same can be
said of the admiralty jurisdictional grant in section 1333, as well as
the other jurisdictional grants for specific bodies of substantive law.
In an admiralty case, section 1333 authorizes federal jurisdiction but
requires litigants to resort to admiralty law to determine their rights,
remedies, and defenses. The same is true of section 1350-it autho-
rizes federal jurisdiction and requires litigants to turn to interna-
tional law or a United States treaty to resolve the merits.
Filartiga is best characterized as a federal question involving
rights under international law. This suggests, but does not mandate,
two choice of law conclusions. The first is that there is no genuine
choice of law question-we merely apply the law on which the claim
and the jurisdictional grant are based. The second conclusion is that
if Filartiga is a federal question, then it is not a transitory action
since the latter arises under a foreign law. This eliminates one major
argument for applying lex delicti to international torture cases.
Many commentators argue that foreign torture claims are transitory,
and, as noncontractual transitory claims, they should be governed by
empted in cases of universal jurisdiction. See id. § 404 reporters' note 2 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1981).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
73. 630 F.2d at 889.
74. This is the weaker of two arguments for the point that Filartiga has an open choice
of law question. The stronger argument is that the choice of law is unsettled because the
international torture norm itself provides at best only a grant of jurisdiction, and does not
provide the necessary substantive rules to apply to the merits. If this were true, the torture
norm would be one of universal jurisdiction. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. It
is not true, however, that international law is incapable of resolving a dispute where it only
establishes a basic norm (e.g., the customary norm prohibiting torture), and fails to define the
delict or state the defenses and remedies. Inspecific norms are applied in international law by




the appropriate foreign substantive law. However, if Filartiga is a
federal question, then it is not a transitory action because the latter
arises under a foreign law. 75 Accordingly, while lex delicti may ar-
guably be a desirable choice of law for policy reasons, its application
is not mandated nor even suggested by the nature of the Filartiga
claim.
The above conclusions, though plausible, are inadequate in fail-
ing to consider the applicability of universal jurisdiction, protective
jurisdiction, or dedoublement fonctionnel concepts. Filartiga could
arguably be both a federal question and any one of these. Resolving
these questions about Filartiga's definition requires an examination
of its jurisdiction under international law.
V. International Law as Defining Filartiga
International law is particularly appropriate to Filartiga as the
law creating the substantive torture claim, and, to some extent, the
standard by which other nations and scholars will judge Filartiga.
On the other hand, the role of international law as an analytical tool
to define Filartiga is secondary to its role in creating the substantive
torture norm. That is, international law plays a primary role in cre-
ating the substantive torture norm; it plays a secondary role (forum
law is primary) 71 in fashioning the torture norm for litigation in a
United States court. Nonetheless, international law is important to
this analysis, particularly in broadening Filartiga's definition to in-
clude its criminal law aspects, which are the key to some of the la-
bels applied to Filartiga.
International law standards for criminal jurisdiction are much
more detailed than are its rules for civil jurisdiction. The former are
more helpful in defining Filartiga if Filartiga can be deemed a penal
action to any degree.77 One reason for characterizing Filartiga as
partially penal for purposes of jurisdictional analysis is because "civil
jurisdiction is ultimately enforced by criminal sanctions, there is in-
deed no great difference between the problems created by the asser-
tion of criminal and civil jurisdiction over aliens."78 In other words,
if Filartiga-type actions are to be valid under international law, they
may have to satisfy international law's stricter standards for state
75. See infra notes 154-169 and accompanying text for a discussion of Filartiga and
transitory actions.
76. Characterizations and definitions relating to conflict of laws are determined by fo-
rum law. See CONFLICT RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 7.
77. See infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
78. See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 299. See also id. at 309 (stating that as to state
legislative jurisdiction under international law, there is no distinction between civil and crimi-
nal law, and likewise no distinction between state legislative and executive jurisdiction under
international law).
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criminal jurisdiction over aliens. Before considering the stricter lim-
its of state criminal jurisdiction, however, the vague limits on civil
jurisdiction will be examined.
A. State Civil Jurisdiction Under International Law
International law has few clear rules on state civil jurisdiction
and those it has offer little toward defining Filartiga. Those vague
guidelines should nonetheless be reviewed to insure a thorough anal-
ysis, and to examine Filartiga's validity under international law.
One of the more unsettled areas of international law is the ques-
tion of what limits, if any, it places on state civil jurisdiction. There
are three general views. First is the extreme view that international
law places virtually no limits on state civil jurisdiction. 79 A more ac-
cepted view holds that the only limit is sovereign immunity. 80 The
third view espouses a principle of reasonableness based on the forum
state's connection to the dispute.81 The reasonableness standard may
79. According to Akehurst, "Dicey believed that the only limitation on jurisdiction in
civil trials was contained in the principle of effectiveness." Akehurst, Jurisdiction in Interna-
tional Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 170 (1972-73) [hereinafter cited as Akehurst], quot-
ing A. DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS xxxi (2d ed. 1908). Akehurst does not agree with Dicey,
but instead believes that the acid test of jurisdiction is the presence or absence of diplomatic
protest. Akehurst, supra, at 176. Rheinstein stated that "at present it seems that no limitations
are generally recognized beyond the one which is contained in the principle that no nation's
officer is allowed to engage in the exercise of power within the territory of another." Rhein-
stein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 CHI. L. REV. 755 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as Rheinstein]. Fitzmaurice stated that "apparently international law does not effect any de-
limitation of spheres of competence in the civil sphere, and seems to leave the matter entirely
to private international law ...." Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law,
92 HAGUE RECUEIL (1951 II) 218 [hereinafter cited as Fitzmauricel. Chief Justice Marshall
decreed that "the jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily absolute. It is
susceptible to no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction would imply a diminution of
sovereignty to the extent of the restriction." The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, I 1 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). But see Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 276-77 (1808)
(Marshall's statement that where a state asserted judicial jurisdiction "contrary to the law of
nations, that judgment would not be regarded by foreign courts"). Marshall's statements are
not necessarily contradictory, but rest on a relatively narrow view of international law. Most of
the no-limits advocates subscribed to the jurisdiction-as-power theory, which may explain
Marshall's view. See Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, Ill HAGUE
RECUEIL 9, 73-75 (1964 1) [hereinafter cited as Mann].
80. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 451-60 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1981); id. §§ 428-29, 461-67 (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1983); HENKIN, P. S. & S., supra
note 13, at 490-540; Akehurst, supra note 79, at 177; M. WHITEMAN, 5 DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 218-19 (1965). Many of the scholars advocating the no-limits view may have
simply overlooked the sovereign immunities exception, although some may not have subscribed
to it as a jurisdictional limitation, but saw it only as a matter of comity or public policy.
81. See Mann, supra note 79, at 73 (arguing that states comply with international
law's limits on civil jurisdiction to give their own judgments international validity). Mann cites
a German scholar who suggested a categorical imperative of state jurisdiction, requiring that
the state "should act so that, in Kantian language, the principle of its own regulations could
serve as the principles of international legislation." Id. at 74, quoting NEUNER, INTERNATIO-
NALE ZUSTANDIGKEIT 14 (1929). Presumably Neuner's formulation applies to judicial jurisdic-
tion as well as legislative jurisdiction. See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW § 441 and comments following (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981); id. part IV, introductory
note at 94-95. Brownlie has stated that the presumption of territorially based jurisdiction,
"whilst remaining the best foundation for the law, failed to provide ready made solutions for
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be the echo of similar standards under various states' laws, 2 and
thus may not be an emerging norm of international law. Discarding
the poorly supported no-limits view, it is clear that international law
places some limits on state civil jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns.8 3
Aside from sovereign immunity and a possible reasonableness
standard, international law appears uninterested in regulating state
civil jurisdiction. It has no rules on subject matter jurisdiction,84 and
no choice of law theory 5 (although international law may suggest
choice of law in specific matters)."' One explanation for international
law's lack of concern with state civil jurisdiction may be that most or
all states did not intend for international law to regulate their civil
jurisdiction, certainly not to the extent of providing subject matter
and choice of law rules.
Fitzmaurice offers another explanation. He states that the pur-
pose of international law is to encourage rather than restrict state
civil jurisdiction because the danger is not in states exercising too
some modern jurisdictional conflicts," and as a result, a state ought to require a "substantial
and genuine connexion" between the forum and the lawsuit. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 298.
He adds that the sufficiency of jurisdictional grounds is normally relative to the rights of other
states rather than a question of basic competence. Id.
82. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW part IV, introductory note
at 94-95 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). Mann has noted that in spite of international law's greater
current impact on state jurisdiction, the notion that states actually recognize an internationally
imposed "minimum contacts" standard "could be put forward only with extreme diffidence
and caution." Mann, supra note 79, at 74-75.
83. The existence of sovereign immunity is clear; the boundaries of that immunity are
not.
84. International law does not concern itself with the division of the judicial workload
within each state, and in that sense has no rules of judicial competence relating to subject
matter or venue. Of course international law does have subject matter categories such as
human rights law and the law of state succession, but these do not have the normative aspect
that subject matter competence does. For a description of international law's position, see N.
LEACH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 109-10 (1973).
85. Akehurst, supra note 79, at 216-26; Mann, supra note 79, at 20. See also
Cheatham, Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 430, 431-37 (1941). But
see Rheinstein, supra note 79, at 802-17 (arguing that international law did have a conflict of
laws system founded on the Roman jus gentium). Other scholars disagree that jus gentium
was the equivalent of modern public international law. See, e.g., HENKIN, P. S. & S., supra
note 13, at 2; Akehurst, supra note 79, at 212. Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law of
Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 191-94 (1942). Additional
support for a choice of law scheme in international law is found in the duty to provide a forum
to resident aliens with foreign claims, coupled with the rule that a state may not apply its own
law to a dispute with which it has no connection. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 79, at 220 n.2
and accompanying text. This would not direct the choice of any specific law such as lex delicti,
but would steer the court away from applying its own law to certain foreign disputes.
86. Article II of the Declaration on the Prevention of Torture provides that "[wihere it
is proved that an act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
has been committed by or at the instigation of a public official, the victim shall be afforded
redress and compensation in accordance with national law." Declaration on the Prevention of
Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975).
Although the Torture Declaration is non-binding, it may be persuasive of the proper
choice of law for torture cases. This was the district court's reasoning in Filartiga II for using
Paraguayan law to measure actual damages. The court added punitive damages that were
unauthorized under Paraguayan law but, according to the court, compelled by international
law. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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much jurisdiction, but in exercising too little." International law re-
sponds to states' reluctance to assume jurisdiction by not imposing
limitations, and by creating a duty to furnish a forum for residents
(including resident aliens) with foreign claims. The duty exists even
when it means applying a foreign law, although international law
does not dictate which foreign law. Note that the duty to provide a
forum is not a rule of jurisdiction, but a rule of state responsibility
for treatment of aliens. International law obliges states to afford
aliens access to local courts, but the aliens' presence in local courts is
still subject to the forum's jurisdictional standards.
One further limit on state civil jurisdiction is the discrediting
and possible prohibition of "tag jurisdiction." This controversial de-
vice is the service of process on a person who is temporarily in the
forum's territory. It is criticized by most commentators and may be
contrary to international law,88 though it is not yet contrary to
United States law.8 9 This point does not undermine Filartiga's juris-
diction because Pena's presence in the United States was no doubt
sufficient; he had sold his home in Asuncion and moved his mistress
and her son to live with him in Brooklyn. The disfavor or possible
unacceptability of tag jurisdiction is, however, a caveat for Filar-
tiga's would-be successors who are tempted by the transitorily pre-
sent torturer.
International law's vague guidelines on state civil jurisdiction
endorse Filartiga in two ways. First, international law generally ac-
quiesces in the exercise of a state's civil jurisdiction rules. If that
acquiescence gives rise to the reasonable connection standard dis-
cussed above, Filartiga's facts should qualify. 90 Second, international
law requires states to furnish a forum for resident aliens' claims.
This implies more than passive support for Filartiga-type litigation;
the United States has an affirmative duty to hear such claims.91 This
is not to say that international law rules on state civil jurisdiction
support torture claims per se; it is to say that if an alien has a legally
87. Fitzmaurice, supra note 79, at 219-20. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 299.
88. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441 comment e and
reporters' note 4 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981); Mann, supra note 79, at 77; cf. Akehurst, supra
note 79, at 170-71.
89. See CONFLICT RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §§ 27-28 and comments following. See
also W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 48-50 (7th ed. 1978). But see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 8 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
90. The RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW sets out eleven crite-
ria, any one of which may establish the "reasonableness" link with the forum. The first crite-
rion is presence (other than transitory) in the forum, and the third is residence in the forum.
Pena's presence in New York, where he had established a household with his mistress and her
son, and had applied for an extended visa, should satisfy these criteria. See RESTATEMENT
(REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
91. See supra note 87. This is not to say that the duty is absolute to furnish a forum
for resident aliens' claims. Other factors such as forum non conveniens and foreign policy
interests may supercede the duty to resident alien claimant.
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recognized claim against another alien in the forum, international
law endorses a hearing on the merits. Thus there is a presumption in
international law which favors resolution of disputes between aliens
in a disinterested forum. Admittedly this might run contrary to the
forum state's national interests at times, particularly its foreign pol-
icy interests. But such interests should be heeded only on a case-by-
case basis and should not give rise to a blanket preemption of human
rights claims.
International law rules on state civil jurisdiction are unable to
characterize adequately a Filartiga-type action because its rules do
not address the subject matter jurisdiction or choice of law problems.
The only conclusions that may be drawn from state civil jurisdiction
rules is that international law requires a state to furnish a forum for
claims made by resident aliens and it acquiesces in the type of juris-
diction exercised in the Filartiga case (assuming that the jurisdiction
in Filartiga is based on a reasonable connection with the forum
state) to the extent that Filartiga is a civil action. But is Filartiga
more than a civil action? To answer this it is necessary to examine
international law rules governing state criminal jurisdiction, keeping
in mind the premise that "there is in principle no great difference
between the problems created by assertion of civil and criminal juris-
diction over aliens."19 2
B. State Criminal Jurisdiction Under International Law
1. Why Consider Filartiga a Criminal Action?-Filartiga is a
civil action, a tort, according to the jurisdictional grant of section
1350.92 But inherent in Filartiga-type cases under section 1350 (and
probably in any torture case under any legal theory) are aspects of
criminal prosecution.
The first aspect is the criminal law nature of universal jurisdic-
tion. Filartiga is commonly referred to as an instance of universal
jurisdiction94 not unlike the piracy cases of earlier centuries. 5 Uni-
versal jurisdiction, at least up to now, had been for criminal prosecu-
tions even though civil remedies may have been available as well.9
92. See supra note 78.
93. "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
94. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
95. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1981); B. DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY (1980) [hereinafter cited as
DUBNER; TRIAL OF THE OFFICERS AND CREW OF THE SCHOONER SAVANNAH (1862). See also
BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 243-45; HENKIN, P. S. & S., supra note 13, at 246-47.
96. The piracy conventions refer only to criminal prosecution, with civil restitution to
be handled administratively by the prosecuting state. See Harvard Research in International
Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, arts. 12 & 13, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 749, 751 (1932); Conven-
tion on the High Seas, art. 19, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 45 U.N.T.S. 82 (both reprinted in DUBNER, supra note 95, at 11-12, 90-93). But
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Customary international law may not have ordained universal juris-
diction for torture cases,9 7 and if so, there may be purely civil alter-
natives under this new grant of universal jurisdiction. But because of
the criminal law history of universal jurisdiction, Filartiga must be
considered under the limits of a state's criminal jurisdiction.
The second aspect of a criminal prosecution is Pena's detention.
Filartiga was not viewed as a criminal case by the district court or
the Second Circuit, but it can be argued that Pena was subjected to
criminal type measures. Although he faced only monetary loss in the
lawsuit, Pena was detained until the district court dismissed the ac-
tion for failure to state a claim.98
While Pena's detention was based on his visa violation rather
than the section 1350 lawsuit, his detention was continued because
of the section 1350 action.99 Pena was released when the trial court
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. But since the Second
Circuit has ruled that torture violates international law and thus es-
tablishes section 1350 jurisdiction, detention such as Pena's would
now continue throughout the lawsuit. 10
At first glance there is nothing wrong with this detention. If the
filing of a civil action reveals a crime, the state may prosecute with-
out "criminalizing" the original civil lawsuit. If, however, the filing
of a section 1350 torture claim reveals an immigration crime that
gives rise to defendant's detention, and that detention is prolonged
during the section 1350 lawsuit when it would have been resolved by
deportation if not for the lawsuit, some may see the section 1350
action as quasi-criminal.
The third criminal aspect of Filartiga is the punitive damages
sought against Pena. Under United States law (which was not ap-
plied in Filartiga), such damages would be available as compensa-
while the piracy conventions make no provision for civil remedies, the RESTATEMENT (RE-
VISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW notes that international law "does not preclude the appli-
cation of non-criminal law on this basis [universal jurisdiction] ... ." Id. at § 404 comment b
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). Moreover, the piracy conventions apparently permit civil prosecu-
tion at the discretion of the state that seized the pirates. The Convention on the High Seas,
art. 19, supra, provides that "the seizing state may decide upon the penalties to be imposed,
and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property,
subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith." DUBNER, supra note 95, at 12. Since
the remedies are at the prosecuting state's discretion, civil remedies could be added even
though the plaintiffs could not have filed the lawsuit before the pirate ship was seized.
97. According to the Second Circuit in Filartiga I, customary international law now
prohibits torture.
98. Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d at 878-79.
99. See supra note 39.
100. Defendants in future Filartiga actions would not be confined unless they are ac-
cused of a crime, as was Pena, or there is some other reason for incarceration. But the typical
Filartiga defendant is likely to be a notorious political torturer. As notorious torturers they
may enter the United States under false pretenses, as did Pena. This would permit incarcera-
tion. Unless defendants could post bail, which presumably would be high, they might remain
in jail pending the civil action and awaiting subsequent deportation.
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tion for Pena's malicious acts.'' Under Paraguayan law (which was
applied in Filartiga), punitive damages are not allowed."' 2 Civil law
jurisdictions, such as Paraguay, view punitive damages as an imposi-
tion of punishment in a non-criminal trial that lacks the safeguards
of criminal law and procedure. 0 3 Another objection is that punitive
damages are a windfall for plaintiffs since they compensate beyond
the injury suffered.
Many human rights advocates, however, believe that torture
compensation should cover nonpecuniary losses, and some call for
punitive damages. While criminal jurisdiction is not necessary for
punitive damages under United States law, it may be necessary
under international law. Accordingly, in order to establish a suffi-
cient jurisdictional basis for awarding punitive damages it is neces-
sary to determine whether United States courts have criminal juris-
diction under international law over accused tortures.
The fourth aspect of Filartiga that is partially criminal is the
dual civil/criminal nature of the torture prohibition under interna-
tional law. The customary norm against torture encompasses both
state prohibitions and international policy declarations. The state
prohibitions include criminal penalties,10 4 and the policy declarations
reinforce torture's criminality. Indeed, some future applications of
the international torture norm will no doubt involve stern criminal
sanctions.
Filartiga is both a tort action under section 1350 and an inter-
national cause of action with a broader scope. To the extent that
Filartiga is an international action, we may want to consider using
the term "delict" instead of the narrower "tort" to describe the act
of torture. A delict is best defined as an intentional wrong, including
both torts and crimes.10 5 By calling Pena's acts delicts, we are con-
sidering them as wrongs that have both civil and criminal penalties
even though the plaintiffs seek only private civil remedies under sec-
tion 1350.
Accepting the civil/criminal duality of the international torture
101. Punitive damages for torture are available under United States law either under
intentional tort theories or civil rights actions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See Sexton v.
Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062 (1972); cf City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (punitive
damages not available against a municipal government defendant).
102. Filartiga, No. 79-917 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 1983) (magistrate's report and recom-
mendation). See also XI INT'L ENCYC. COMp. L., ch. 9, at 4 (H. McGregor ed. 1972) (stating
that legal systems outside the common law generally reject punitive or retributive damages).
103. See J. GHIARDI, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.03 (1981); K. RED-
DEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 1.3(F), 2.4(D) (1980).
104. See Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d at 881-84; THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 122-26,
160-63 (L. Henkin ed. 1981); Symposium, Terror in the Modern Age: The Vision of Litera-
ture, The Response of the Law, 5 HuM. RTS. Q. 109 (1983). For policy arguments as to human
rights in general, see L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978).
105. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (5th ed. 1979).
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norm does not enlarge the torture action under section 1350. It re-
mains a private action for recovery of actual and punitive damages.
Nonetheless, it is advisable to view the section 1350 torture actions
in the broader framework of a civil/criminal action. This would ac-
count for the criminal overtones of Pena's detention. This would also
make Filartiga more acceptable to foreign legal systems that might
not have understood or accepted the notion of section 1350 as a
purely civil remedy because of the punitive damages. Recognizing
Filartiga's criminal aspects under international law provides a basis
for assessing penalties that might satisfy foreign legal systems with-
out actually criminalizing the action under United States law. This
civil/criminal duality should also make Filartiga more acceptable in
terms of recognizing and enforcing United States judgments in for-
eign fora where defendants might have assets.
Due process, of course, must be considered as Filartiga takes on
criminal overtones. Courts receiving section 1350 complaints might
want to consider requiring plaintiffs to make a stronger showing at
the outset before issuing process against defendants, especially where
incarceration is involved. Once that showing is made, incarceration is
justified for notorious torturers like Pena, who failed to identify him-
self fully to immigration officials as the subject of numerous Or-
ganiation of American States and Amnesty International reports.106
The court might want to consider further criminal due process re-
quirements, but those requirements need not necessarily meet the
standard of United States criminal due process. Filartiga actions,
whatever their criminal overtones in international law, are still not
criminal actions under United States law.107
Because Filartiga is not a criminal action under United States
law, there is no need to inquire into United States law on criminal
jurisdiction. To the extent that international law defines Filartiga as
a criminal prosecution in a United States forum, however, it is nec-
essary to explore the limits of state criminal jurisdiction under inter-
national law.
2. International Law Limits on State Criminal Jurisdic-
tions.-Unlike international law's weak regulation of state civil ju-
risdiction, international law places distinct limits on state criminal
jurisdiction. These limits are specific and are stated as subject mat-
ter categories. Scholars generally agree that there are five categories,
and they agree on the definition and details of four of these subject
matter categories. There is some dispute on the fifth category con-
cerning universal jurisdiction.
106. See supra note 31.
107. Section 1350 covers civil claims only.
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Ian Brownlie's analysis of state criminal jurisdiction"°' provides
the best framework within which to analyze Filartiga's choice of law
question. Brownlie lists six limits on state criminal jurisdiction by
splitting the traditional universal jurisdiction class into two classes:
offenses common to all nations (universal offenses), and offenses
against international law."0 While other scholars may not support
Brownlie's distinction between universal and international offenses,
neither do they agree among taemselves on universal jurisdiction.
Given the lack of resolution on universal jurisdiction, Brownlie's
analysis is as valid as any. Moreover, Brownlie's analysis facilitates
characterization of the Filartiga cause of action by squarely placing
Filartiga in Brownlie's sixth category-international offenses. This
eliminates the view of Filartiga as a universal cause of action.
Brownlie's six categories of state criminal jurisdiction are based
on six principles of authority. These six principles are enumerated
below.
(a) The territorial principle.110-A state has authority over
crimes committed within its territory. This is inapplicable to Filar-
tiga because its delict was committed in Paraguay. None of the sig-
nificant acts occurred in the United States.
(b) The nationality principle. "'-Nationality is generally rec-
ognized as a basis for a state's jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts
committed by its nationals. This principle is inapplicable to Filartiga
because Pena is not a national of the United States.
(c) The passive personality principle.1 2-A state has authority
to punish aliens for acts committed abroad that harm the forum
state's nationals. This is a controversial principle of jurisdiction, but
inapplicable to Filartiga because none of the defendant's acts
harmed United States nationals. This principle could, however, be
the basis for United States jurisdiction over defendants who torture
United States nationals in another country, if the defendants could
be served with process in the United States.
(d) The protective (or security) principle.11 -A state has au-
108. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 300-04.
109. Id.
110. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 300-02. See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1) comments a, b (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
111. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 303. See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) comment c (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
112. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 303. See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(c) comment e (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
113. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 303-04. See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(3) comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). The term protective
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thority over aliens who commit acts abroad which affect security of
the state, if the acts are against the state's law. This principle fo-
cuses primarily on political security, but is not limited to that. Typi-
cal crimes are counterfeiting, immigration violations, and other "eco-
nomic offenses" and acts affecting the operation of the state's
governmental functions (and perhaps its quasi-governmental business
functions). Brownlie states that the protective principle is not neces-
sarily limited to acts harming the state per se, 114 and thus could in-
clude torture offenses; but it is probably inapplicable to Filartiga be-
cause Pena's acts did not affect United States security.
(e) The universality principle. 5-A state has authority over
nonnationals for certain foreign violations when circumstances, in-
cluding the nature of the crime, justify repression of the act as a
matter of international public policy. Brownlie suggests that common
crimes such as murder are suitable for universal jurisdiction when
the state in which the crime occurred refuses prosecution or extradi-
tion. Another example is a crime by a stateless person in a place not
subject to any state's territorial jurisdiction."' Filartiga does not fall
within Brownlie's definition of universal jurisdiction because Filar-
tiga's substantive claim under section 1350 is based on a violation of
international law. If, however, the Second Circuit is wrong in hoid-
ing that customary international law prohibits torture, then the Fi-
lartigas' claim might be suitable for universal jurisdiction.
(f) Crimes against international law.1 17-A state has authority
principle has a different meaning under United States law than under international law. In the
United States the term protective principle-or protective jurisdiction-refers to certain areas
in which Congress has authorized federal court jurisdiction although no federal substantive
law is involved. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 400-18, 860-66. Areas under fed-
eral protective jurisdiction tend to be those where some federal right is at least indirectly
involved. See id. at 869-70, and Note, Protective Jurisdiction and Adoption as Alternative
Techniques for Conferring Jurisdiction on Federal Courts in Consumer Class Actions, 69
MICH. L. REV. 710 (1971). These federal rights, however, are not related to individual eco-
nomic rights or rights affecting United States security. The justification for protective jurisdic-
tion is that state courts are not always capable of enforcing rights that exist under state law
and federal courts should therefore try the case applying state law. While the concept of fed-
eral protective jurisdiction is both vague and controversial (see discussion in HART & WECHS-
LER, supra note 67, at 415-18, 860-70)), it seems clear that it is not the same concept as the
protective principle of state criminal jurisdiction under international law. Accordingly, com-
mentators should be careful to specify which label they intend to use.
114. Id.
115. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 304. See Akehurst, supra note 79, at 160-66, who
agrees with Brownlie that universal jurisdiction includes common crimes where an interna-
tional interest is involved. See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
443 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
116. Piracy is the most common example historically. Air hijacking and certain kinds of
terrorism are the newer versions of crimes by stateless persons.
117. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 305. As noted in the text, Brownlie's "crimes against
international law" category is his creation; other scholars generally include jurisdiction for
crimes against international law under the universal jurisdiction heading. The United States
[Vol. 3:1
DEFINING Filartiga
to punish violations of international criminal law and any state with
custody of the suspected criminal may prosecute. This category is
separate from the universality principle because the distinction be-
tween violations of international law per se and violations of laws
common to all nations should be mairitained. Filartiga fits squarely
within the sixth principle if torture is considered a violation of cus-
tomary international law. Accordingly, the validity of the United
States assertion of jurisdiction over Pena in accordance with this
principle depends on the separate issue of whether torture is a viola-
tion of customary international law.
Summarizing the criminal jurisdictional limits on Filartiga, the
first three principles-territorial, nationality, passive personal-
ity-clearly do not apply to Filartiga. The fourth principle, protec-
tive jurisdiction, may apply if the United States has some national
interest at stake in a Paraguayan torture case. 1 8 The fifth principle,
universal jurisdiction, applies to Filartiga only if one rejects Brown-
lie's distinction between universal crimes and crimes against interna-
tional law. If Brownlie is followed, the term universal should not be
applied to Filartiga. If, on the other hand, the Supreme Court or the
Second Circuit strikes down the Filartiga holding that torture vio-
lates international law, 119 torture claims could still be litigated under
the universal jurisdiction category as offenses against the collective
national laws prohibiting torture. Under the Second Circuit's holding
in Filartiga, the sixth principle regarding crimes against interna-
tional law appears to be applicable, but may not be directly appro-
priate in a Filartiga-type torture claim (a section 1350 civil claim)
unless the sixth principle provides private remedies for international
crimes. Or, alternatively, the sixth principle may apply if Filartiga-
type litigation under section 1350 is considered a partially criminal
prosecution.120
Constitution, however, distinguishes between piracy (a universal crime) and "offenses against
the Law of Nations." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 404 reporters' note I (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
118. The protective jurisdiction principle may also apply if the United States meaning of
protective jurisdiction is embraced within the international law meaning and if international
law has granted national courts special jurisdiction in this matter. (This special authorization
by international law is more appropriately termed "universal jurisdiction").
119. The recent appellate decision in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984), may signal the judicial split likely to occur in Filartiga's progeny. Judge
Edwards believes that Filartiga is a valid model for human rights litigation, but that the Tel-
Oren plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to state a Filartiga-type claim. Judge Robb did
not address Filartiga's legal validity; he believes the controlling issue is United States foreign
policy, which he believes cannot withstand foreign torture claims being litigated in United
States courts.
120. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
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VI. Defining Filartiga: The Five Possible Actions
In order to determine what law should apply to the Filartiga
case, it is necessary to determine what type of cause of action it is.
The different labels that have been applied to Filartiga-type jurisdic-
tion give rise to five different possible causes of action. Filartiga may
be any one, or more than one, of these actions.121 The five types are:
(1) international delict adopted into United States federal common
law; (2) universal jurisdiction action; (3) transitory action; (4) pro-
tective action; and (5) dedoublement fonctionnel action.
A. Type One: Filartiga as an International Delict Adopted into
United States Federal Common Law
An international delict is an offense against international law as
it is found in custom, convention, general principles of international
law, or other sources of international law. 122 Claims under interna-
tional law are capable of enforcement in an appropriate forum,
which often is an international arbitral tribunal or the International
Court of Justice. 123 But if the delict entails private remedies, either
expressly or implicitly, 124 then it is enforceable by private parties in
state courts having jurisdiction under both international law and
state law.' 25 The United States has adopted international law intoits
121. Transitory actions follow the parties. That is, they can be litigated wherever per-
sonal jurisdiction is obtained, and are typically in tort or contract. Universal actions are those
for which international law has authorized jurisdiction in any state having the power to prose-
cute, and typically include heinous offenses such as piracy and genocide. International law
provides only the jurisdictional grant for actions under universal jurisdiction; the prosecuting
state applies its own remedies. But the prosecuting state could allow civil remedies for such
offenses. While international law does not expressly provide for civil remedies in actions under
universal jurisdiction, it does not forbid them, and it leaves broad discretion to the prosecuting
state. This would seem to allow for actions by individuals injured by defendants. See supra
note 96.
Civil remedies for piracy and other universal delicts are transitory claims because they
follow the parties and can be filed where jurisdiction is obtained over the defendant. Thus, civil
actions under universal jurisdiction are a subset of transitory actions. In fact, all universal
actions-civil and criminal-are by definition transitory. There is, however, a conflicting prin-
ciple that transitory criminal actions are not allowed. The resolution is that all universal ac-
tions-civil and criminal-are transitory by definition, but only the civil universal actions are
deemed transitory.
122. See supra note 105.
123. See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 706-32; HENKIN P. S. & S., supra note 13, at
844-86.
124. As Professor Henkin has pointed out, we are not limited to the express remedies of
international law. Rather, international law creates duties and rights that imply additional
remedies, particularly in the area of human rights. L. Henkin, Human Rights and Domestic
Jurisdiction, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 21, 29
(T. Buergenthal ed. 1977). Moreover, Brownlie states that "there are no rigid forms of action
in international law. ... BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 473. Thus, international law is a
simple, interstitial legal system-it expresses norms which in turn imply remedies for viola-
tions of those norms; these implicit remedies may exist whether or not the norm has an express
remedy.
125. See generally FALK, supra note 19, passim; Lillich, The Enforcement of Interna-
tional Human Rights Norms in Domestic Courts, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
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federal common law, and substantive international law is thus litiga-
ble in the United States.12
1. Is Filartiga a Type One Action?-Yes. The Filartigas'
claim was based on human rights norms of international law. The
Second Circuit founded its Filartiga jurisdictional decision on the
conclusion that torture is a violation of customary international law.
And, as discussed both in the Second Circuit Filartiga opinion and
throughout this Article, the Filartiga claim is also part of federal
common law because of international law's status in the United
States. Thus, the Type One label fits squarely on Filartiga.
2. Is Type One Permissible Under International Law?-To
the extent that Type One is a civil action in a United States court,
international law would probably place no limit on it127 beyond the
requirement that there be a connection between the forum and the
dispute. 12 Filartiga satisfies the connection requirement because the
parties were residents of the forum at the time the action was filed.
The conclusion that international law would place no other limits on
Filartiga as a Type One civil action is underscored by a state's af-
firmative duty under international law to provide a forum for resi-
dent aliens, regardless of which law creates the claim.129
If Filartiga is considered a Type One criminal action, jurisdic-
tion in a United States court is probably valid under Brownlie's sixth
principle of international criminal jurisdiction for states-jurisdic-
tion for crimes under international law. 30 However, this is only to
say that international law does not limit such jurisdiction by states.
The question of whether such jurisdiction is permissible under
United States law is addressed below.
3. Is Type One Permissible Under United States Law?-It is
according to the Second Circuit, whose jurisdictional holding in Fi-
lartiga was based in part on this question.' 3' Some commentators
AND PRACTICE (J. Tuttle rev. ed. 1978). See also HENKIN P. S. & S., supra note 13, at 811-
12.
126. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 131 and comments
following (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980).
127. The majority view is that international law places no limits on state civil jurisdic-
tion. See supra note 79.
128. See supra note 80.
129. See supra note 87.
130. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
131. The Second Circuit's Filartiga I opinion did not clearly define the action. The
court's language implied that Filartiga is transitory, 630 F.2d at 885, and universal, id. at 890.
But the court's express description of the action is one of "federal jurisdiction over suits by
aliens where principles of international law are in issue." Id. at 885. Thus the Second Circuit
Filartiga opinion relied on a Type One definition of the action.
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have criticized this aspect of Filartiga.32 The basis in the Second
Circuit decision to permit a Type One action is that: (1) torture vio-
lates customary international law;133 (2) international law is litigable
in United States federal courts;"" and (3) the court had competence
under section 1350 because section 1350 was both constitutional' 35
and pertinent to the Filartigas' claim.13
The Second Circuit's analysis, however, was based on a charac-
terization of Filartiga as a civil action. If Filartiga is viewed as the
prosecution of an international delict involving criminal sanctions,' 37
the United States' jurisdictional response might be different. Under
international law, states may prosecute those who violate interna-
tional law. But in order to prosecute international crimes in the
United States, the Constitution requires Congress to define the inter-
national crime.1 38 Thus, if Filartiga was considered to have signifi-
cant criminal overtones, or if a criminal complaint were filed in the
United States based on international law torture norms, there would
probably be no jurisdiction until Congress approves.
In summary, Filartiga is a Type One action, a delict under cus-
tomary international law litigated as federal common law in a
United States federal court. Such litigation, to the extent that it is a
civil action, is permissible under both international and United
States law.
B. Type Two: Filartiga as a Universal Action
Universal jurisdiction covers offenses, usually criminal, that are
prohibited by all nations,' 39 and for which international law provides
jurisdiction over nonnationals, even though international law has not
itself prohibited the act. 40 Universal jurisdiction is valid under inter-
national law in any state where the defendant is detained and proper
process served.
This analysis is based on Brownlie's definition of universal juris-
diction.'" His definition differs from that of others in so far as it
narrows universal jurisdiction to exclude acts prohibited by interna-
tional law (those are a separate category of jurisdiction), and broad-
132. See supra note 2 for a list of critics of Filartiga's jurisdiction.
133. 630 F.2d at 881-85.
134. Id. at 885-89.
135. Id. at 885-86.
136. Id. at 889.
137. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
138. Article 1, section 8 provides that Congress shall have the power: "To define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offenses against the Law of
Nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW§ 404 and comments following (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
139. See supra note 115.
140. See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 305 n. 2 and accompanying text.
141. Id. at 304-05.
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ens universal jurisdiction to include common crimes such as murder
that are universally proscribed and for which, under certain circum-
stances, there is a compelling international interest in prosecuting
the defendant in a foreign court.
Other definitions of international law provide for jurisdiction
over specific acts (such as piracy) that international law has decreed
can be prosecuted under forum law wherever the defendant is prop-
erly detained and served. These definitions would exclude common
crimes such as murder.14 Under Brownlie's broader view of univer-
sal jurisdiction which includes common crimes like murder under
certain circumstances, a torture claim could more easily qualify. The
claimants would not have to show that torture was one of the desig-
nated delicts such as piracy-they would only have to show that the
act was egregious and that it would probably go unprosecuted in the
state where it occurred.
1. Is Filartiga a Universal Jurisdiction Action?-No. Al-
though torture is a universal delict in the sense of being prohibited
by virtually all legal systems, state-based or otherwise,4 3 the Filar-
tiga claim did not arise from such norms, either individually or col-
lectively. Rather it arose from international law. While it is true that
the collection of state torture norms comprised part of the basis for
the Second Circuit's finding that torture is proscribed by customary
international law,"4 the international delict is nonetheless distinct
from state norms.
Brownlie's distinction between universal jurisdiction and juris-
diction for international delicts supports the conclusion that Filar-
tiga is not an instance of universal jurisdiction. Under the more com-
mon view of universal jurisdiction, which includes international
delicts, Filartiga would be an instance of universal jurisdiction. Such
a characterization of Filartiga, however, would be unhelpful in ana-
lyzing the choice of law question.
Although Filartiga is not an instance of universal jurisdiction, it
is feasible to speak of a torture claim under universal jurisdiction. It
is therefore appropriate to discuss the validity of universal jurisdic-
tion under international law.
2. Does International Law Permit Universal Jurisdiction Ac-
142. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1981), which describes universal jurisdiction as including only certain offenses
such as piracy, slave trade, war crimes, and others. No reference is made to common crimes
whose facts compel international attention (Brownlie's view). However, the Restatement does
refer to Brownlie's distinction between universal jurisdiction and jurisdiction for violations of
international law, though it does not cite Brownlie. See id. § 404 reporters' note 1.
143. See 630 F.2d at 883-84.
144. Id. at 884.
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tions?-Yes. Universal jurisdiction actions are valid under the
universality principle.'4 5 If the action is civil, the permissibility is all
the more clear because of international law's deference to states in
civil cases.
3. Does the United States Permit Universal Jurisdiction Ac-
tions?-Probably not with respect to torture claims. Brownlie states
that the United States and other Anglo-American legal systems dis-
favor universal jurisdiction in cases other than piracy and air hi-
jacking.""6 Torture claimants could argue that the policies favoring
prosecution of piracy and air hijacking should support prosecution of
torture, but courts may be slow to accept that argument in the ab-
sence of Congressional action.
If, however, United States courts did decide to accept torture
claims as an instance of universal jurisdiction because of the interna-
tional pronouncements against torture, such claims would be viable.
There are no other categorical jurisdictional barriers to such actions
in the United States. Jurisdiction would be proper only in federal
courts because the threshold question of universal jurisdiction is one
of international law, and hence federal law. This analysis suggests
jurisdictional validity only for civil claims under universal jurisdic-
tion. Criminal prosecution under universal jurisdiction would en-
counter problems too numerous to consider here.
If the United States courts did not accept torture claims under
universal jurisdiction-there is another way to bring the same civil
claim in nonfederal courts in the United States under a different ju-
risdictional theory. If a delict such as torture is so widely prohibited
that it qualified for universal jurisdiction, it is probably prohibited by
the state where the act occurred. If so, the claim can be brought as a
transitory action in a state district court. The Filartigas, for exam-
ple, could have filed their claim under Paraguayan law in a New
York state court. This could be done regardless of whether federal
courts were willing to accept the argument that torture claims quali-
fied for universal jurisdiction. There is no theoretical problem for
plaintiffs currently bringing torture claims as transitory civil actions
in state district courts, provided the claim is based on a foreign law
applicable to them.
Note the similarity between universal jurisdiction actions and
transitory actions. Both assert rights under lex delicti, and lex
delicti would determine the merits in both cases. But universal juris-
diction actions are litigable only in federal court (because of the in-
145. See supra notes 115-16 for a discussion of the universality principle.
146. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 304.
[Vol. 3:1
a DEFINING Filartiga
ternational law questions of universal jurisdiction). 147 Transitory ac-
tions are litigable only in a state district court unless there is
diversity of citizenship or pendent jurisdiction 148 to qualify it for fed-
eral court.
Another important point is that the term universal jurisdiction
probably should be applied where some Untied States scholars are
calling Filartiga a "protective action."149 Within the realm of inter-
national law, protective jurisdiction means "jurisdiction for state se-
curity purposes."'' 50 The United States definition of protective juris-
diction is somewhat closer to the human rights mark because it
refers to federal court acceptance of jurisdiction for rights guaran-
teed by nonfederal law in cases in which state courts may be inade-
quate for social or political reasons. 151
While the United States definition of protective jurisdiction as
jurisdiction utilized to protect rights threatened by social or political
unrest may seem appropriate to the Filartigas' claim, it is nonethe-
less confusing because of the very different meaning of protective
jurisdiction in international law. To avoid this confusion, the term
protective jurisdiction should not be applied to international human
rights actions. Instead, the term "universal jurisdiction" should be
used for cases involving rights that are universally recognized by
state law, and which should be prosecuted in foreign courts as a mat-
ter of international policy.
C. Type Three: Filartiga as a Transitory Action
"Transitory action" has more than one meaning, or at least
more than one usage. Its definitions range from "an obligation based
exclusively on a specific foreign law"'' 52 to "an action arising under
no particular law, but simply based on facts occurring outside the
147. See supra note 71.
148. See infra notes 166-67.
149. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
152. Filartiga (Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief on jurisdiction, filed July 23, 1979) 11-12,
citing Slater v. Mexican National Railway Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904). See also Blum and
Steinhardt, supra note 20, at 63 n.52 and accompanying text. This is the Bealean meaning of
transitory, based on the now discarded "vested rights" theory. While that theory has yielded to
the view that torts are governed by the law with the most significant relationship to the claim
(CONFLICT RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §§ 6, 145), the author believes that the Bealean the-
ory is still reflected in the common usage of "transitory action," particularly with torts. Two
points underscore this: First, even if transitory torts are no longer conclusively governed by the
lex delicti, there is still a strong presumption favoring lex delicti. See, e.g., CONFLICT RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 9, §§ 145-79. Second, now that Beale's vested rights theory of foreign
claims is not followed, and foreign torts are merely presumed to be governed by lex delicti, the
use of the term transitory in reference to causes of action appears to be declining in the United
States. This leads to the conclusion that transitory is a term linked to the Bealean vested rights
notion of rights based exclusively on a specific law.
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forum state. ' 15 3 Though another definition of transitory may be
more proper in these post-Bealean times when vested rights is a dis-
credited theory, 54 this Article will focus on the meaning of "transi-
tory action" that is most popular with those who call Filartiga a
transitory tort. That meaning is "a tort claim based on lex delicti,
litigable wherever personal jurisdiction is obtained in a state whose
public policy is not offended by the litigation."' 155
Transitory actions are generally civil actions. The United States
does not allow transitory criminal actions'56 and international law
disapproves of them except when the crime is of sufficient interna-
tional interest to justify universal jurisdiction. 157
1. Is Filartiga a Transitory Action?-No. The Filartiga claim
is based on international law, not on lex delicti (in the Filartiga case
153. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 85 (3d ed. 1977); BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1343 (5th ed. 1979).
154. If "transitory action" is to have any relevance to current United States conflicts
law, it is not in relation to specific foreign causes of action. Instead it may be used (as it is in
venue matters) to distinguish between claims that are litigable in any forum where the defen-
dant is served with process (which are transitory claims), and claims litigable only where the
property or subject matter is located (local actions). This is Leflar's usage. See supra note 153.
Another possible usage is to distinguish between claims based on events occurring in the fo-
rum, and claims based on events outside the forum. This usage has choice of law significance
because the claim based on foreign events carries a presumption of nonforum law being ap-
plied. However, some foreign claims will overcome the anti-forum-law presumptions; see, e.g.,
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) and similar
cases discussed in E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 594-602 (1982). Some of the
claims based on events in the forum will not be eligible for forum law (e.g., where the parties
have contracted for another substantive law). If "transitory action" is used in this latter sense,
as a claim based on events (but not "arising under" a law) occurring outside the forum, then
Filartiga is a transitory claim. This latter usage does not appear common in discussions on
Filartiga.
155. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-917 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 1979) (plaintiffs' appellate
brief on jurisdiction) citing CHESHIRE'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 257-61 (8th ed. 1970);
WESTLAKE'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 267-72 (6th ed. 1922); PHILLIMORE, COMMENTA-
RIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3d ed., Vol. 4 (1889); 2 C.J.S. 47-48. These older sources
are indicative of the Bealean usage of "transitory action" by plaintiffs' attorneys. See also
Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d at 885, for the use of, transitory tort as a lawsuit based on a specific
foreign law.
156. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1) comment a (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1981); CONFLICT RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 89 (1971).
157. Brownlie's view of universal jurisdiction is that it includes common but heinous
crimes such as murder in certain circumstances where a compelling international interest re-
quires prosecution in a foreign court. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. If
Brownlie is correct that common crimes can, because of their compelling circumstances, some-
times offend international policies and interests and thus be eligible for universal jurisdiction,
then such crimes could be prosecuted in United States courts. Although this formula would
satisfy international law, it might not satisfy United States law. United States courts will not
"enforce the criminal law of a foreign state in a criminal proceeding." RESTATEMENT (RE-
VISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1) comment a. See also CONFLICT RESTATEMENT,
supra note 9, § 89. Moreover, a person cannot be prosecuted for an international crime in the
United States unless Congress has adopted a statute to define and punish the offense. RE-
STATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 reporters' note 1. See United
States v. Hudson and Goodwin, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); United States v. Coolidge,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 415, 417 (1816). These limitations on criminal jurisdiction, however, do
not necessarily prevent plaintiffs from seeking civil remedies under criminal norms.
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lex delicti would be Paraguayan law). Nevertheless, the Filartigas
could have pursued a transitory claim under Paraguayan law. Such
an action could be filed in a court of general jurisdiction in the
United States, or in a federal court as a pendent claim,' 58 or under
diversity jurisdiction.1"9 In Filartiga all parties were Paraguayan, so
diversity of citizenship did not exist. But ancillary jurisdiction was
possible because of Filartiga's primary claim under international
law. The Filartigas' attorneys pressed this distinction between a
transitory Paraguayan claim and an international law claim and as-
serted distinct arguments. The Second Circuit, however, found juris-
diction only for the claim under international law.16
The Filartigas also had the option of filing a transitory action in
a New York state court, based solely on Paraguayan law. Because
this option is open to torture and other human rights claimants, it
will be helpful to discuss its jurisdictional validity.
2. Does International Law Permit Transitory Actions?-Yes.
Transitory actions are generally private civil actions,16 1 and as such
are only loosely regulated (if at all) by international law. The only
limit international law may impose on transitory actions is the re-
quirement that the forum be reasonably connected with the dispute.
This requirement would probably be satisfied if the parties were resi-
dents of the forum. It may even be satisfied if the defendant were
only temporarily present.1 62 Temporarily present does not mean tran-
sitorily present-the latter may be unsatisfactory for personal juris-
diction under international law.1 63
International law not only acquiesces in but actually encourages
states to accept transitory actions. States have a duty under interna-
tional law to provide a forum for resident aliens even if it means
applying a foreign law. This rule seems tailored to the transitory ac-
tion. Even though this rule is not jurisdictional (it is a policy rule,
158. For a general discussion of pendent jurisdiction, see C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION § 3567 (1975); HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 917-26.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
160. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 887.
161. This is another way of stating that governments do not often litigate transitory
actions. There are no transitory criminal actions under United States law, and civil claims by
public bodies in the United States are most often litigated in the forum belonging to that
government entity.
162. See CONFLICT RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 28 comment a (1971) (stating that
"[ilt is immaterial that the individual is only temporarily in the state. His presence in the
state, even for an instant, gives the state judicial jurisdiction over him." But see RESTATEMENT
(REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441 comment e (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) ('" 'Tag'
jurisdiction, e.g., jurisdiction based on service of process on a person only transitorily in the
territory of the state, is not generally acceptable under international law.").
163. See supra note 88.
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jurisdiction must be established separately),"6 4 it does encourage the
acceptance of transitory claims.
3. Does United States Law Permit Transitory Actions?-Yes.
Courts of general jurisdiction in the United States may accept tran-
sitory civil actions under their conflict of laws rules. These rules re-
quire minimum contacts between the forum and defendant, and no-
tice and opportunity to be heard.6 5 United States federal courts may
not accept transitory actions unless there is diversity jurisdiction, 66
or the claim is pendent to a primary federal claim. 167
D. Type Four: Filartiga as an Action Under Protective Jur-
isdiction
This critique of protective jurisdiction will focus only on the in-
ternational law meaning, which is jurisdiction over issues affecting a
state's protection or security. As noted in the earlier section on uni-
versal jurisdiction, the United States' notion of protective jurisdic-
tion-the protection by federal court jurisdiction of rights guaran-
teed under nonfederal law-is included in the international law
concept of universal jurisdiction, at least as far as human rights or
civil rights are concerned.
Protective jurisdiction under international law is the authoriza-
tion for a state to impose its judicial jurisdiction on aliens for acts
committed outside the forum state's border when such acts threaten
the forum state's security.' 66 The actions are typically criminal of-
fenses, but do not necessarily exclude civil remedies. 6 9
1. Is Filartiga a Protective Action?-No. Filartiga does not
fit the international meaning of protective jurisdiction because the
rights at issue in Filartiga do not involve security of the forum state.
It would seem that Filartiga-type claims, or any private claims for
164. See supra note 87.
165. See CONFLICT RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §§ 24-25 and comments following.
This assumes that the forum has judicial competence under local law.
166. See supra note 159.
167. See supra note 158.
168. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 303-04.
169. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1981) states as follows:
(2) A state's exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to a person or
thing is reasonable if, at the time jurisdiction is asserted, any one of the follow-
ing applies:
U) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on outside the
state an activity having a substantial, direct or foreseeable effect within
the state, which created liability, but only in respect to such activity;
Comment c states that this applies to criminal and civil jurisdiction. See also CONFLICT RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 9, § 37.
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human rights, would never fit international protective jurisdiction be-
cause private rights and state security rarely coincide. One instance
in which they might coincide is when protection of an alien's private
right is essential to the ongoing protection of that same right for the
forum state's citizens. Piracy cases in the nineteenth century are an
example, as is genocide in the twentieth century. But as noted else-
where in this Article, such claims are generally based on universal
jurisdiction. 170
Because protective jurisdiction as defined by international law is
apparently inapplicable both to Filartiga and other human rights lit-
igation, an examination of its jurisdictional validity is unnecessary
here. Some commentators, however, have determined its validity
under both international and United States law. 171
E. Type Five: Filartiga as a Dedoublement Fonctionnel Action
Some scholars have proposed that state jurisdiction in Filartiga-
type cases is valid under the notion of dedoublement fonctionnel.
This theory-which is a policy argument rather than a legal doc-
trine-holds that higher level courts in each state compose an inter-
national judiciary, and that as such they have a duty to hear claims
under international law for which there is otherwise proper jurisdic-
tion. The policy argument is that maintenance of the international
order is in everyone's interest, and that states, as the prime function-
aries in the international order, should promote international inter-
ests through their executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
The original dedoublement fonctionnel theory was espoused by
the French scholar Georges Scelle.172 Scelle suggested that states'
executives have a double function: as the highest officials of their
own countries they have a duty to advance its interests and carry out
its law; as the principal actors in the international political order
they also have a duty to respect and advance the laws and interests
of the international order. It is possible that these duties might con-
flict when a state's interest is inconsistent with the international in-
terest. The duty to the international order is a counterpart to the
duty to the domestic order, and the international interest should not
be summarily subordinated to the domestic interest.
170. See supra notes 132-33, 146 and accompanying text.
171. See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 303-04; RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 441(2)0) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981); CONFLICT RESTATEMENT, supra note
9, § 37.
172. See generally W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 148 (1964); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC OR-
DER 40 (1961) [hereinafter cited as McDOUGAL & FELICIANO]; FALK, supra note 19, at 72
n.21 and accompanying text; Wilner, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: Comments on Sources of
Human Rights Law and Means of Redress for Violation of Human Rights, 11 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 317, 321-22 (1981).
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States' executives have this duty to the international political
order because their states are part of that order and have actually or
tacitly agreed to uphold it. An analogy can be made to the chief
executive of a business corporation who has duties both to his stock-
holders and directors on the one hand, and to the larger business
community on the other. This could require him to honor a contrac-
tual duty seemingly contrary to the company's interests in order to
fulfill his obligation as a functionary in the business community.
Naturally the company's interests would prevail most of the time.
But even when self interests prevail, the company president is con-
scious of his other obligation to the business community.
At first glance, this example seems to differ from dedoublement
fonctionnel because the company president may face legal sanctions
if he violates rules of the larger group. But the erring state also faces
legal sanctions when it violates international law. 73 The state's chief
executive thus has an incentive to obey international law, just as the
company president has an incentive to obey local law. Regardless,
fear of legal sanctions is not the point. Rather, the point is that these
duties-the state executive's to the international system and the
company president's to the business community-are not merely du-
ties prescribed by law. These duties are necessary for the respective
systems to work. Thus, the chief executive of a state has a duty both
to advance the state's interests and to adhere to the interests of the
international system; both are necessary for our present world to
function.
Just as states' executives have an obligation to the international
order, states' judiciaries also have a role in maintaining the system.
International law is allowed in states' courts. It is commonly liti-
gated in United States federal courts in matters of admiralty, expro-
priation, treaty interpretation, and so on. The only requirement for
such litigation is that the forum's jurisdictional rules be satisfied.
The policies that cause federal courts to hear admiralty and expro-
priation claims support human rights litigation as well.1 74
The policy behind dedoublement fonctionnel is that states'
courts should be used to support international human rights. Now, it
is one thing to argue that states' judiciaries should entertain interna-
tional human rights claims-it is quite another to argue that states'
judiciaries should do so as part of an international judicial system.
The latter argument proposes the existence of an international judi-
173. See generally HENKIN, P. S. & S., supra note 13, at 16-27.
174. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUB-
LIC ORDER 164 n.8 (1980). See also supra note 172. Note that McDougal's urging that
Scelle's dedoublement fonctionnel theory be applied to human rights litigation in United
States courts goes back to the 1961 edition of LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER.




If dedoublement fonctionnel is applied to states' judiciaries,
there are three distinct interpretations. First, to the extent that
dedoublement fonctionnel simply encourages states to hear interna-
tional human rights claims in their courts, it may be nothing more
than a restatement of the states' obligation to furnish their courts to
aliens with foreign claims. 175 This interpretation should be rejected
because it adds nothing to existing policy and renders dedoublement
fonctionnel meaningless. 176
The second interpretation is that dedoublement fonctionnel may
be a rule of subject matter jurisdiction that allows a court to hear
cases not covered by its own subject matter rules. Regardless of a
forum state's subject matter jurisdiction rules, dedoublement fonc-
tionnel urges that the state's highest level courts be available for tor-
ture claims which meet personal jurisdiction requirements. If
dedoublementfonctionnel is an imposition of subject matter jurisdic-
tion on state courts, it is superfluous in the United States where fed-
eral courts have subject matter jurisdiction over international law
claims. The dedoublement fonctionnel concept would still be useful,
however, for those states where subject matter jurisdiction for inter-
national law is less certain.
The third interpretation is the most radical one. Under this in-
terpretation, dedoublement fonctionnel means a state court should
act in an abnormal capacity, that is, to function as something other
than a state court. If the dedoublement fonctionnel description is
taken literally to mean that high level state courts compose an inter-
national judiciary, then state courts ought to function as "interna-
tional courts" as opposed to merely being state courts trying interna-
tional claims. The effect this would have on courts' behavior is
speculative. 177 Court procedure would almost certainly be different
175. States have a duty to furnish a forum for resident aliens' claims, either under local
law or foreign law. See supra note 87. Arguably, dedoublementfonctionnel simply reflects this
duty to provide a forum, and adds claims arising under international law to the existing cate-
gories of forum law and foreign law under which aliens might have transitory claims.
176. Although this interpretation adds nothing to the existing doctrine that obliges
states to furnish a forum to aliens with foreign claims, that obligation has not been met in
regard to human rights claims. Thus, even if dedoublement fonctionnel is no more than a
restatement of a preexisting obligation, it may be necessary to encourage acceptance of valid
human rights claims.
177. When a New York court applies Pennsylvania law to a case, the court retains its
procedural norms: the method and content of pleading; burdens of proof and other fact finding
norms; evidentiary rules; and so on. If the New York court were to somehow "become" a
Pennsylvania court, the most immediate change would be the switch to Pennsylvania
procedure.
But in addition to the procedural switch, there is an added dimension of shifting the
court's identity. A New York court-the judge and other personnel-have a certain under-
standing of their function that runs deeper than the function of legal procedures. It is their
understanding of their place in the system, i.e., both their social relevance in the immediate
legal system and in the larger society. This understanding might not be lost in transplanting a
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when the court is acting as an international body. This extreme view
is probably untenable both politically (for foreign policy reasons)
and practically (because of the difficulty in ascertaining and apply-
ing a different judicial procedure). On the other hand, history offers
examples of the "redeploying" of courts. One example is the United
States and English experience in combining equity and law courts.
The law/equity duality differs form the dedoublement fonctionnel
proposal in that the former was commanded by a sovereign. None-
theless, the law/equity examples illustrate the benefits and the feasi-
bility of assigning a dual purpose to a court. Of course, the decision
to use United States federal courts as international tribunals has
never been faced. But if Filartiga-type litigation becomes common in
the United States and elsewhere, and if international law is used as
the substantive law, then use of non-forum procedures for certain
issues may be appropriate.
Thus, dedoublement fonctionnel as applied to states' judiciaries
may be another name for the "forum furnishing" doctrine, or it may
be a subject matter jurisdiction rule, or it may be a concept that
would radically alter the function of state courts litigating certain
international claims. The first interpretation adds nothing to current
practice. The second is unnecessary in the United States where there
is already subject matter jurisdiction for international law claims in
federal courts. The third is untenable for political and practical rea-
sons. Because dedoublement fonctionnel does not add anything to
Filartiga's choice of law analysis, comment on its jurisdictional va-
lidity under international and United States law is unnecessary.
VII. Conclusion
Although Filartiga was originally pleaded as three different
types of causes of action,' only one label applies. Filartiga is an
international delict litigable under United States federal common
law, and nothing more. It is not a transitory action, nor one of uni-
versal jurisdiction (although it could have been both). It is not a
protective action, either in the international or the United States
meaning of that term. It may or may not be an instance of dedouble-
New York court to Pennsylvania, but it would be lost or at least disturbed in calling upon a
New York court to act as an international body. This confusion of identity appears to be the
strongest argument against the extreme dedoublement fonctionnel theory (that the highest
level of domestic courts in each state should act as an international judiciary). If we are to
have an international judiciary, institutions should be created for that purpose rather than
imposing the function on domestic courts.
178. In plaintiffs' appellate brief, Filartiga was argued as: (1) a wrongful death action
under Paraguayan law (a transitory action); (2) an action under universal jurisdiction for the
torture offense; and (3) a violation of international law. Although these causes of action labels
were used, all were focused on one cause of action under section 1350. See Appellant's Brief at
11-53, Filartiga 1, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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ment fonctionnel, but that theory adds nothing to the jurisdictional
or choice of law inquiry.
A proper characterization of Filartiga is a predicate to the
choice of law question involved in Filartiga-type cases. Having de-
fined, or characterized, the Filartiga action as an international delict
litigated as United States federal common law, it is now possible to
prepare for the second phase of choosing Filartiga's law-examining
the legal system that might apply, the norms within those systems,
and the policy reasons for choosing one legal system over another.
Before closing this initial phase of Filartiga's choice of law
analysis, there are a few cursory choice of law conclusions to be
made. The first relates to the use of the term "wrongful death" in
describing the Filartiga action. 179 While the term "wrongful death"
may. be factually accurate, it has no legal significance in the Filarti-
gas' claim under international law. If Pena's delict were governed by
United States law, it is very likely that wrongful death would name
the cause of action, or at least one of the causes of action. But under
international law the term wrongful death is no more than rhetoric.
The delict is torture. The fact that Joelito died aggravates the of-
fense, it does not deal in specific causes of action, but only in norms,
violations of those norms, and remedies.80
A second cursory conclusion flowing from Filartiga's definition
is that because this is an international law claim, international law
should apply to the merits. Some scholars have depended on Filar-
tiga's mistaken labels to support the application of something other
than international law-in most instances, Paraguayan law.' 8 ' This
179. The term "wrongful death" is used throughout the Second Circuit's opinion in Fi-
lartiga, as well as in the plaintiff's jurisdictional briefs. Plaintiffs' brief states: "The Filartigas
brought this action in the Eastern District of New York against Amerigo Norberto Pena-Irala
(Pena), also a citizen of Paraguay, for wrongfully causing the death of Dr. Filartiga's seven-
teen-year-old son, Joelito." Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Wrongful death has been used to describe the events in Filartiga as well as the plaintiff's
alternative claim under Paraguayan law. Joelito Filartiga's death is better described as a tor-
ture-death, for both the legal and the semantical import.
Use of the term "wrongful death" to describe Filartiga is inappropriate. Filartiga's invo-
cation of the torture proscription under international law is no more a wrongful death action
than a section 1983 lawsuit for prisoner mistreatment is an action for assault. By adhering to
accurate terms, international human rights law will be put in its proper focus, which is the
regulation of a government's relationship and interaction with individuals. The use of inaccu-
rate terms such as wrongful death gives the impression that international human rights law is
nothing more than an alternative system for redressing private claims against governments.
International human rights law is much more than an International Federal Tort Claims Act.
180. See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 473-75.
181. D'Zurilla argued that international law does not prohibit torture, but that torture is
a universal crime to which the court could apply either Paraguayan law or federal common
law. D'Zurilla, supra note 2, at 214-15, 216-17. See also Comment, The Alien Tort Statute:
International Law as the Rule of Decision, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 872 (1981) (cautioning that
the Filartiga court should apply Paraguayan law unless there are compelling reasons to apply
international law).
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Article has countered such conclusions to the extent that they are
based on an inappropriate definition of Filartiga as anything other
than an international delict under federal common law.
This is not to say that international law is now mandated as the
choice of law, or that other considerations besides Filartiga's defini-
tion do not dictate the application of Paraguayan law. Although
characterizing Filartiga as an international delict under federal com-
mon law indicates that international law should apply, other consid-
erations are also involved in a choice of law analysis as well. Fairness
to the defendant and other international interests may dictate appli-
cation of some other law.
